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ABSTRACT: Extemal direct investment flows in Less Developed Countries (LDC) have registered an 
importan! growth in the last decades. They seem to be a sounder way of getting externa! financing far 
LDCs than commercial loans. The present study is an attempt to carry out sorne research on the 
determinants of Foreign Direct lnvestment (FDI) in LDCs of Latin America. Firstly, sorne ideas are 
stated about the convenience of FDI far LDCs. together with the theoretical background to the 
difieren! hypotheses that aim to explain the FDI ftows to LDCs. The paper presents and describes 
also a formalized model, designed to test the validity of these hypotheses. The study finishes with 
sorne empirical results, obtained from a cross country analysis out of a sample of Latin American 
countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Externa! direct investment flows in Less Developed Countries (LDC) have 
registered an importan! growth in the last decades. They seem to be a sounder way of 
getting externa! financing far LDCs than commercial loans. The present study is an 
attempt to carry out sorne research on the determinants of Foreign Direct lnvestment 
(FDI) in LDCs of Latín America. The paper is organized in the fallowing way: Section 2 
analizes the convenience of FDI far LDCs. Section 3 provides sorne theoretical 
background to the different hypotheses that aim to explain the FDI flows to LDCs. 
Section 4 describes the model used and shows sorne empírica! results. Sorne 
concluding remarks are stated in Section 5. 
2. IS FDI DESIRABLE FOR LDCs? 
During the years that fallowed !he Second World War, the contributions of the 
members of CEPAL held a considerable influence on the governments of LDCs. They 
emphasized the political and economical evils of FDI flows, that were thought to 
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weaken the political autonomy of governments and damage the LOCs' economies by 
the transfer of profits abroad. Their arguments were basically political and ideological 
and lacked a scientific background, but undoubtedly they favoured the LOCs' 
policymakers' negative attitude towards FOi. In any case, this view has changed in 
recent years; both empirical and theoretical analyses tend to state the convenience and 
beneficia! effects of FOI fer LOCs, and sorne policymakers are modifying their approach 
to FOi. 
However, why is FOI actually desirable? 
Firstly, FOI has turned out to be a better alternative to externa! finance than 
international debt. The crisis that erupted in 1982 tragically showed that massive loans 
of commercial banks were no longer a convenient source of raising funds from abroad 
fer LOCs. 
lnstead, it is clear that FOI implies a lesser degree of risk to the host country 
that externa! debt. Whereas loans will have to be repaid in any case, independently of 
the yield from the investment project financed by them, the transfer of dividends abroad 
only exists provided that the investment has been profitable. The burden of risk is thus 
shifted from domestic debtors to foreign investors. 
In the second place, it should be noted that many economists have considerably 
changed their view regarding the economic policy that should be implemented in 
developing countries. Neither import substitution nor stabilization policy that fecuses 
only on the shifts of the aggregate demand, have proven to be a useful approach to 
macroeconomic policy in LOCs. Rather, a great number of specialized research works 
agree that the solution seems to be more in the supply side of the economy. Their 
advice, therefere, is to carry out structural adjustments in the productive capacity, in 
arder to achieve higher goals as far as the efficiency in the allocation of resources is 
concerned. There are different sorts of policies directed to this aim: trade liberalization, 
privatization, development of incentives, investment in human capital, and, finally, 
attraction of FOI; in other words, ali measures that can improve the productivity of 
resources. 
Recent studies have shown that FOI generates positive spillovers and 
externalities, as new technology, management and marketing skills enter to the host 
country associated to FOi. Thus competitiveness is festered and productivity is 
increased 1 . The economic environment, therefere, becomes more .innovative and 
human capital is also likely to improve 2. 
Finally, FDI generates employment if the economy is not at full employment, as 
happens. in Latin American countries. 
Hence, recent literature seems to lend countenance to the belief that FOI is 
highly desirable fer LOCs. In fact, sorne of the countries that have implemented serious 
adjustment referms - Chile and Mexico - have encouraged FOI in their packages of 
measures. The results, hitherto, have been satisfactory. 
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3. DETERMINANTS OF FDI: MAIN HYPOTHESES. 
What are the factors that attract FOI to LOCs? Many studies on the subject have 
been published in recent years, but there is not a clear answer yet; however, a brief 
summary of the more relevant hypotheses that constitute the theoretical basis of this 
tapie can be presented3. 
1. Output and market size hypotheses: As a matter of fact, output and market 
size hypotheses are not exactly the same, as the first ene refers to the microeconomic 
leve! whereas the second is based on a macroeconomic approach. However, the 
differences between them in practice are irrelevant, so we shall consider them to be the 
same hypothesis. Basically, a positive relationship is assumed to exist between the 
output of a country and the FDI that comes into it. A greater output in the host country -
as measured by sorne proxy, such as GOP, fer example- means a larger market and, 
therefore, a bigger volume of potential sales. Eventual economies of scale and 
decreasing costs are also linked to a greater output in the host country. lt should be 
taken into account. nevertheless, that most analyses do not make any distinction 
conceming the scope of activities of the foreign firm: i. e. ,whether it operates fer the 
domestic market or, instead, directs its production abroad; obviously, if the multinational 
plans to export most of its output, this hypothesis will lose part of its validity. 
Unfertunately, statistical constraints and scarce availability of data precludes the study 
and differentiation of these alternative cases. 
Oespite ali these limitations, sorne empirical studies - fer example, Nunnenkamp, 
1991 - have feund a positive correlation between output in the host country and FOi. No 
conclusive results, however, have been reached so far when assuming a relationship 
between growth of GOP and FOi. At a first glance, it could be thought that both 
variables are positively correlated, but there is no evidence to support this idea so far. 
2. lnertial effect: According to this, firms tend to remain in the host countries 
where they have previously invested. The availability of infermation and the better 
knowledge of the market that is acquired, as a result of fellowing historical patterns of 
investment, encourage subsequent inflows of FOI into that country. Nevertheless, as 
has been rightly pointed out (Nunnenkamp, 1991, p. 5 ) part of the FOI staying in a 
country may be involuntary, dueto the long gestation periods of the projects undertaken 
or to political restrictions to repatriation. There is sorne empirical evidence fer specific 
countries. that shows that this effect has been significan! in thé cases of UK investment 
in Commonwealth countries, German activities in Brasil and Argentina and, to a certain 
extent, US flows to Argentina and Mexico 4. In any case, the stability in capital 
fermation is greater as far as the manufacturing sector is concerned, whereas in the non 
manufacturing sector - basically service activities - fereign investment seems to be 
rather volatile. 
3. Agglomeration effect: the development of domestic investment -and its 
eventual expansionary effects on the economy - is thought by sorne authors to improve 
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both the infrastructure and the macroeconomic conditions of the country, hence 
attracting FOi. Foreign and domestic capital farmation do not substitute, therefare, but 
complement each other. (Pfaffermann, 1992, p. 46). There is even sorne evidence that 
shows that there is a greater technology transfer to a host country in which technology 
is already more developed 5 . 
4. Hypothesis of debt overhang: this source of explanation is more specific far 
sorne LOCs, i.e. those that are heavily indebted. According to it, the creditworthiness of 
a developing country can easily be damaged because of the high volume of 
outstanding debt; hence, a heavy burden of externa! debt disincentivates new FOI as 
well as further lending. The evidence is greater far the link between debt overhang and 
domestic investment: sorne IMF studies (IMF, 1989) find the role of debt overhang 
significan! in domestic investment slowdowns in LOCs. Also, Savvides (1992) has 
reached the same conclusion. As regards externa! investment, the empírica! analyses 
are more scarce. However, sorne studies can be found, such as Nunnenkamp (1991), 
that tests the impact of debt overhang in FOI and finds positive correlation. 
Nevertheless, evidence is not conclusive enough yet as far as the influence of debt 
overhang in FOI is concerned: further research should be carried out in this direction. 
lt should be noted that testing the debt overhang hypothesis needs an 
operational measure of indebtedness; the useful indicators have proven to be not so 
much the absolute figures of outstanding debt but, rather, sorne traditional debt 
indicators -debt /GOP, debUexports, debt service /exports- that give a more accurate 
picture of the solvency of the country. 
5. lnstitutional background: As many theoretical analyses show, it seems to 
play a crucial role in Latín American countries: the political institutions that exist can 
increase ar diminish the risk and uncertainty related to a project, thus encouraging or 
disincentivating FOi. 
Firstly, as far as the general política! atmosphere is concerned, political instability 
and other features of the social environment - rent-seeking activities, bureaucracy, poor 
governing, corruption and the so called "endemic evil" of Latín American populism -have 
a distorting effect on the economy in general and, more specifically, a discouraging 
effect in FOI (see Lancaster, 1992); expropiations, wars and civil disturbances are not 
uncommon in a country in which such features exist. The unfareseabl discretional 
interventions of the governments, which are rather frequent in Latín America, also 
diminish political credibility, hence harming potential investors' expectations. 
On the other hand, sorne specific features of the política! system can be 
significant when taken into account by fareign investors: far instance, as has been 
recently demonstrated, investors from abroad prefer a clear regulatory system, whereas 
they dislike the necessity of negotiating individual agreements on tax breaks and 
subsidies6. lt is also preferable to have a unifarm tax system far both domestic and 
multinational firms. Also the policies concerning the repatriation of dividends are likely to 
be considered by future investors; sometimes it can be difficult to transfer profits abroad 
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if political reguta'tions have constrained the access by the multinational to the currency 
market. 
We consider as very significan! the fact that a new agency of the World Bank, 
the Multilateral lnvestment Guarantee Agency (MIRA) has been promoted, in arder to 
provide assesment and assurance far potential investors in LOCs 7. 
Oespite its importance, empírica! evidence related to this tapie is scarce so far, 
due to the difficulties of quantifying and measuring all these variables, which are of a 
qualitative nature. 
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL ANO SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The influence of severa! factors in FOI, mainly related to the hypotheses stated 
above, has been tested by a cross -country study, in which data from a sample of 25 
Latín American countries during the period 1970-88 were employed ª· 
The final presentation of the equation u sed is : 
lt = ª + b Yt - 1 - e O t-1 + d i t-1 +e r t-1 - fe t-1 + g 
where: 
1: dependent variable (FOI) in year t (in millions of dollars). 
Y: represents GOP and enters into the model as a proxy to output size of the 
host country, in arder to test the validity of the market size hypothesis. 
O: Oeflator of GOP, that measures the inflation rate and is u sed as an indicator 
of macroeconomic stability. lt has a negative sign, as high inflation rates introduce a 
considerable distortion into the economic environment, thus harming investors' 
expectations. 
i: Gross domestic investment as a percentage of GOP, in arder to analyse the 
strength of the "agglomeration effect". 
r: Rate of growth of GOP, also asan indicator of macroeconomic performance. A 
greater rate should suggest better economic conditions, therefare being correlated to 
higher levels of FOi. 
C: Oebt service/exports ratio, as an indicator of the country's creditworthiness. 
The minus sign is consisten! with the debt overhang hypothesis: a big ratio shows a 
greater leve! of indebtedness and should be negatively associated with potential FOi. 
ª:constan! 
g : residuals. 
The data were taken from the World Tables (World Bank, 1990). The 
independent variables were lagged one period. 
The econometric results of OLS estimation are shown in Table l. There is no 
multicollinearity between the independent variables, measured by the condition index 
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and R2 auxiliar. Heteroskedasticity levels are low, as tested by the Breusch-Pagan and 
Harvey tests. The statistical significan ce of the coefficients are analyzed by the t-test. 
The independent variable Y, that accounts far the output and market size, is 
highly significan!, in almos! every year. Our analysis suggests, therefore, that FDI flows 
have mainly foliowed the pattern described by the market size hypothesis: i. e. : 
international investors prefer to direct their capital inflows to large countries, in which 
the feasibility of gaining more clients and increasing sales in a greater proportion is 
stronger. 
Anyhow, it should be stated that sorne theoretical studies available -basicaliy 
Agarwal, 1980- include the output hypothesis within the subgroup of !hose determinants 
of FDI that assume perfect competition in both product and factor markets of the host 
country. As that is not the case in most Latin American countries, this seems to suggest 
that the precondition of competitive markets is not essential far the validity of this 
explanation. Rather, we think that market size can be a strong determinan! even in 
countries in which imperfect competition prevails as far as the market structure is 
concerned. 
As regards the influence of inflation, measured by the GDP deflator, it is only 
significan! in certain years of the first half of the period. This seems to indicate that 
macroeconomic stability criteria were often offset by the "inertia effect" and market size 
considerations: as was stated above, the inertia effect basicaliy exists in !he larger 
countries of the area -Argentina, Brasil and Mexico- which also have the biggest rate of 
inflation in many cases. 
The "agglomeration effect", however, seems to have little importance because of 
the smali t - ratio that corresponds to the "i" variable in most cases. Finaliy, the 
hypothesis of debt overhang does not appear to be very relevan!, either. Our 
interpretation is that the size of the country is such a decisive determinan!, that it can 
overcome other possible factors of influence such as creditworthiness or domestic 
investment trends. 
No relevance, either, is associated to the links between FDI and the rate of 
growth of GDP. This result is similar to those reached by other studies, as was pointed 
out in section 3. 
Notwithstanding these ideas, it should be added that the results are heavily 
influenced by the case of Brazil: if Brazil is omitted from the sample the coefficients 
become more significant. Because of its rather volatile behaviour, Brazil's data have not 
been considered in the foliowing years: 72-74, 76-78, 80-81, 88. This fact indicates that 
this Latin American country deserves further attention, as its policy has differed from 
that implemented in the rest of the continent. The figures show (see Table 11) that FDI to 
Brazil experienced a big increase between 1972 (570 mili. doliars) and 1973 (1341 mili. 
doliars). lts pattern was quite stable during the 70s. This is easily explained by the 
relatively outward - looking strategy that Brazil adopted during the 1970s. One of the 
consequences of this policy was the positive attitude of policymakers as far as entry of 
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direct capital from abroad was concerned. Moreover, in those years Brazil was 
considered to be one of the most promising and dynamic economies of the continent. 
However, in 1982 the debt crisis burst when Mexico, Argentina and Brazil declared 
themselves incapable of coping with their financia! compromises. FDI to Brazil feli from 
2534 mili. doliars in 1982 to 1373 mili. doliars in 1983. On the other hand, inflation rose 
heavily, basicaliy from 1983 onwards; one of the peaks took place in 1985-1986, so it is 
not surprising that FDI was again strongly reduced from 1267 mili. doliars in 1985 to 331 
mili. doliars in 1986. 
Mexico's pattem should also be considered a little more carefuliy. lt has been 
excluded from the sample in 1977, 1980, 1981, and 1988. FDI experienced a noticeable 
growth from 1977, where the figure is 556 mili. doliars, to 1978 (829 mili. doliars) and 
1979 (1332 mili. doliars) Figures remained high until 1982, whereas in 1983 direct 
investment dropped to 461 mili. doliars. This behaviour can be explained by the 
favourable conditions that the Mexican economy experienced due to the second rise in 
oil prices, that !asted till the 1982 debt crisis, which also affected FDI flows into the 
country; FDI figures do not recover till 1986, partly as a result of the more liberal and 
outward oriented policies that were carried out in the second half of the 80s. 
lt should also be noted that Chile's data reflect very accurately the drastic 
change in economic policy due to the fall of Allende's regime. More specifically, the 
entry into the government of sorne ministers connected with the Chicago school greatly 
liberalised the economy and removed the obstacles to direct investment from abroad. 
Thus FDI jumped from -556.8 mili. dollars in 1974 to 50 in 1975. Although the trend is 
not very steady, capital inflows increase substantialiy in the late 70s and early 80s. 
The analysis of the residuals is also very interesting. There is not white noise, 
and that means, in our opinion, that the political background has certainly sorne 
influence on FDI: one possible explanation is that the residuals include still the 
information concerning the political environment and the attitude of policymakers 
towards FDI, that is not reflected within the model because of the qualitative character 
of these variables This aspee! should be analised in a "case by case" approach, as it is 
specific to each country within the area. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study does not aim to provide definite results about the determinants of FDI 
flows, pattly because of the difficulty in o_btaining the accurat'e data and identifying the 
theoreticaliy corree! specificationsRather, this paper is more of an exploratory kind. 
Nevertheless, in our opinion, the results are worth considering in arder to understand 
FDI behaviour in LDCs. 
Two main conclusions can be presented. Firstly, FDI flows oriented to Latin 
American LDCs are apparently influenced basically by the size of the host country. The 
host country's GDP was used as a proxy of its output and market size, and was highly 
significan! in almost ali the years considered. This result confirms other findings in this 
direction that explain foreign investment by the output and market size hypothesis. 
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According to this, potential investors prefer to develop their activities in larger countries, 
where expected sales are greater and econornies of scale can reduce average costs in 
the long run. 
Secondly, the analysis of the residuals and the experience of sorne specific 
countries seern to indicate that political constraints can also have a relevant influence 
on the attraction ar discouragernent of direct capital inflows. This result confirrns other 
theoretical studies and suggests that policy rnakers in the potential host countries can 
pursue sorne rneasures oriented to attracting FDI: their role is not only passive, but 
rather, they can foster externa! investrnent by rernoving the restrictions to dividends 
repatriation and other political barriers that disincentivate this sort of capital inflows. 
Such policies are advised in arder to expand econornic growth in LDCs. Furtherrnore, 
these sort of rneasures also contribute to the liberalization and structural adjustrnent of 
the econorny, which will bring about greater levels of productivity and efficiency. 
lnertial effect is relevant only in sorne specific countries, such as Argentina and 
Brasil. However, when it exists, it is quite strong and can even offset adverse 
rnacroeconornic conditions. 
In our analysis, other hypotheses, such as debt overhang or agglorneration 
effect, were not very significan!. Still, the statistical lirnitations related to the gathering of 
data in Latin Arnerica prevent the consideration of these results as definitive. Rather, 
further research on this tapie should be carried out in the future. 
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NOTES 
1. See Nicolaides. 1990, p. 123. 
2. See World Bank, 1991, p. 94 for case studies that show the links between 
FOI, technological transfers and efficiency. 
3. Agarwal, 1980, provides a clear and complete survey. 
4. Empirical analyses of this sort can be found in Langhammer, 1991. 
5. See Mansfield and Romeo, 1980. 
6. See for instance BIRO 1991, p. 95. 
7. For a description of this institution, Wallace, 1992, can be consulted. 
8. We have focused our study in the Latin American area because it has sorne 
specific features: i.e. almost ali the nations belonging to it are middle income 
countries; the most heavily indebted nations, moreover, also pertain to it. 
Consequently we follow the nomenclature of the World Bank and IMF as 
regards Latin American countries -or Western Hemisphere-. lt is true that 
there are severa! differerices among the members of the group, in terms of 
leve! of income, policies implemented in the past, and so forth, but the 
existence of common factors enables the region to be studied as a whole. 
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